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Before: KRAUSE and PHIPPS, Circuit Judges, and BEETLESTONE,* District Judge. 
 







* Honorable Wendy Beetlestone, United States District Court for the Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. 
† This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 




KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
Louis Hill pleaded guilty to one count of unlicensed firearms dealing and multiple 
counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm.  He appeals his sentence, arguing the 
District Court erred in applying the gun trafficking enhancement under U.S.S.G. 
§ 2K2.1(b)(5).  We discern no error and so will affirm.  
DISCUSSION1 
The Sentencing Guidelines call for a four-level increase in the offense level of any 
defendant who “engaged in the trafficking of firearms.”  U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(5).  For the 
enhancement to apply, the defendant must have “kn[own] or had reason to believe” that 
his conduct “would result in the transport, transfer, or disposal of a firearm to an individ-
ual . . . whose possession or receipt of the firearm would be unlawful.”  U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 
cmt. n.13(A)(ii).  And an individual cannot “[]lawful[ly]” receive a firearm if “at the time 
of the offense [he] was under a criminal justice sentence, including probation.”  Id. cmt. 
n.13(B).   
Here, the District Court found Hill knew or had reason to know that the confidential 
informant to whom he sold seven firearms was under a probationary sentence at the time.2  
We review that factual finding under the “deferential” clear error standard.  See United 
States v. Richards, 674 F.3d 215, 218–23 (3d Cir. 2012).  Because a review of the record 
leaves us with no “definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed,” United 
 
1 As we write only for the parties, who are familiar with the background of this case, 
we need not reiterate the factual or procedural history. 
2 Although the District Court also found Hill knew or had reason to know that the 
confidential informant “ha[d] a prior conviction for a crime of violence,” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 




States v. Foster, 891 F.3d 93, 113 (3d Cir. 2018) (citation omitted), we have no basis to 
second-guess the Court’s conclusion.  
That conclusion finds substantial support in the record.  There is no question the 
informant to whom Hill sold firearms was on probation during the relevant period, and that 
informant and Hill had many degrees of connection:  They grew up and lived in the same 
neighborhood for many years; had been friends “since at least 2009,” App. 29; attended 
high school together; “commit[ed] crimes together” in their younger years, App. 31; en-
gaged in frank discussions about criminal activities; and, during the relevant period, had 
extensive electronic and face-to-face communications while planning and executing seven 
firearm transactions.  Most relevant, during a recorded telephone call between the second 
and third transactions, the informant told Hill he could not talk because he was “at the PO 
office,” Appellant’s Br. 15 n.3 (quoting the Presentence Report), using an abbreviation that 
the parties agree refers to the probation office.  Given the “substantial relationship” be-
tween Hill and the informant, App. 36, and the informant’s plain statement to Hill during 
the call, the District Court found that Hill knew or had reason to know the informant was 
on probation.  In making that factual finding regarding Hill’s mental state, the Court ap-
propriately relied on circumstantial evidence, see United States v. Douglas, 885 F.3d 145, 
151 (3d Cir. 2018), and drew reasonable inferences based on that evidence.   
Contrary to Hill’s argument, we do not fault the District Court on this record for 
“fail[ing] . . . to rule out any possible innocent inferences,” Appellant’s Br. 8, before mak-
ing its finding.  True, where “the evidence [i]s ‘in equipoise,’ the government ha[s] failed 
to meet its burden” with respect to the imposition of a sentencing enhancement.  United 
States v. Cicirello, 301 F.3d 135, 142 (3d Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).  That principle 




“by a preponderance of the evidence.”  Id.  But that burden was not met in Cicirello because 
“there [we]re no facts from which Cicirello’s knowledge, intent or belief at the relevant 
time c[ould] be gleaned.”  Id. at 141; see id. at 138 (explaining that the record revealed 
“nothing as to where, how, or to whom Cicirello sold the guns”).  The same is true for the 
other decisions Hill cites.  See United States v. Moody, 915 F.3d 425, 428 (7th Cir. 2019) 
(involving a defendant who sold guns to wholly “anonymous buyers”); United States v. 
Askew, 193 F.3d 1181, 1182 (11th Cir. 1999) (involving a defendant who knew neither to 
whom the guns were sold nor “any of the circumstances surrounding the sale”).  Con-
versely, where the record contains “facts from which an inference of . . . knowledge or 
reason to believe can be drawn,” a district court may draw that inference and apply a sec-
tion 2K2.1(b)(5) enhancement regardless whether the defendant is able to identify a more 
“innocent” reading of those facts.  Cicirello, 301 F.3d at 142 & n.5 (collecting cases); see 
Moody, 915 F.3d at 430 (“Moody’s case . . . stands in contrast to those in which the seller 
knew something more about the buyers than that they were in the market for a gun.” (em-
phasis added)); Askew, 193 F.3d at 1184 (contrasting cases in which “the defendants had 
personal contact with the transferees,” making it “logical for the sentencing court to infer 
a certain level of knowledge about their buyers[]”).  And in such cases, a district court is 
not required to sua sponte identify “innocent possibilities” not raised by the defendant or 
reasonably inferred from the facts in the record. 
Here, the evidence was not “in equipoise,” Cicirello, 301 F.3d at 142 (citation omit-
ted), and the District Court had ample factual material from which to conclude the enhance-
ment was appropriate.  Cicirello therefore does not supply the rule of decision.  And while 
Hill has identified other plausible inferences the District Court might have been drawn, we 




flowing therefrom: that the District Court’s “choice between them cannot be clearly erro-
neous,” Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985).   
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.   
